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A B S T R A C T
We observe that popularity shocks are crucial for electoral accountability beyond their effects on voters’
behaviors. By focusing on Brazilian politics, we show that the disclosure of audit reports on the (mis)use of
federal funds by local administrators affects the type of candidates who stand for election. When the audit
finds low levels of corruption, the parties supporting the incumbent select less-educated candidates. On the
contrary, parties pick more-educated candidates when the audit reveals a high level of corruption. These
effects are stronger in municipalities that have easier access to local media.
© 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Electoral accountability is a crucial mechanism that helps guar-
antee the sustainability of modern democracies. It allows sufficiently
informed voters to assess the government’s performance and hold
politicians accountable for their actions (Barro, 1973; Mayhew,
1974). An extensive empirical literature shows that voters reduce
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their support of parties and officials involved in political scandals and
reward politicians who are perceived to perform better (Ashworth,
2012; Ferraz and Finan, 2008; Snyder and Hirano, 2012; Chong et al.,
2015; Costas-Pérez et al., 2012; Bagues and Esteve-Volart, 2016).1
In this paper, we follow up on these findings and account for the
possibility that political parties might anticipate voters’ punishment,
or reward, and change the composition of the pool of candidates
selected to run for office accordingly. Specifically, we show that
the release of information about government corruption affects the
quality of candidates of the incumbent coalition. Intuitively, one
might expect that if a political party (or coalition of parties) supports
a government that faces a negative popularity shock, itmight react by
selecting more appealing and competent candidates to compensate
for the expected poor results in the following election. Symmetrical
intuitions could hold if there is a positive popularity shock: one
might expect the party to behave strategically by reducing the share
1 Interestingly, this effect might not arise when voters already believe politicians
to be malfeasant (Arias et al., 2017), or when the media market structure does
not provide incentives to supply politically-relevant information to their audiences
(Larreguy et al., 2017).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.07.011
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of costly, high-ability candidates given that the election will be less
competitive.2 These ideas are closely related to a recent strand of
literature showing that political parties are strategic players that
take into account specific features of the electoral competition when
making decisions (Galasso and Nannicini, 2011; Mattozzi and Merlo,
2015).3
We address this issue in the Brazilian context by looking at the
effect of popularity shocks resulting from the disclosure of reports
about potential misconduct in local governments on the ability of
candidates for city councilor in the 2004 and 2008 local elections.
Hence, we relate two distinct measures of candidates competence,
one based on education and another based on income, from the coali-
tion supporting (or opposing) the incumbent government with the
release of information about its (dis)honesty.4 This information was
made available to voters through an anti-corruption program intro-
duced in 2003 by the Brazilian central government that monitors
how municipalities spend federal funds. The primary task is per-
formed by auditors who examine municipalities’ accounts to verify
the correct use of federal transfers.
Municipalities are randomly selected into the anti-corruption
program, and the timing of the release of the report is also ran-
dom. These characteristics are crucial for our identification strategy,
as they help to assess the multifaceted endogeneity issue of link-
ing government conduct and the general quality of local politicians.
Another important aspect for our purposes is that the process of
selecting candidates for the city council has a similar schedule in all
Brazilian municipalities. This makes it possible to define when, dur-
ing the term, the selection process is taking place. Further, although
city councilors are elected using an open-list proportional system,
parties play a central role in selecting candidates. In practice, a citi-
zen is eligible to stand for election if he has been affiliated with the
supporting party for at least 12months before election day. Formally,
the candidate list is decided during party conventions that, by law,
are held in June of each election year. This list must be submitted at
least 3months before election day.
We exploit the randomness of the timing of corruption disclo-
sures and, conditioning on the level of corruption, compare the
ability of the pool of candidates in municipalities where the audits
were released during the candidate selection period (i.e., from 12 to
3months before the election) with that of municipalities in which
the audits were released either before or after the selection period.
While our identification strategy closely follows the one used in
Ferraz and Finan (2008), we define treatment slightly differently to
suit our distinct research question.5
Our findings, which are based on 1321 municipalities that were
audited in the period 2003–2010, show that when reports are dis-
closed during the political selection period, they lead to a significant
change in the average ability of the candidates running for the
2 We follow recent studies by considering education level as a proxy for politicians’
ability. See, for example, Ferraz and Finan (2009), Galasso and Nannicini (2011),
Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013), Besley et al. (2011) and Daniele and Geys (2015).
In the next section, we discuss the reasons and the implications of the fact that
high ability candidates are costly for political parties.
3 Specifically, they investigate the demand for politicians, finding that parties
appoint highly educated candidates in competitive districts (Galasso and Nannicini,
2011) and in majoritarian systems, characterized by a higher level of electoral
competitiveness (Mattozzi and Merlo, 2015).
4 While our main estimation relies on education levels, we focus on income only in
a robustness test, as this measure is not precisely estimated: we measure each candi-
date’s salary based on the average national salary of her profession. See Section 6.2.2
for more details.
5 Indeed, Ferraz and Finan (2008) define treated municipalities as those that
received an auditing disclosure anytime before the election. Conversely, our treated
group includes only municipalities before the election, during the period in which
parties provide their candidate lists (between 12 and 3months before the election
day).
city council who belong to the party (or coalition) of the incum-
bent mayor.6 This effect crucially depends on the level of corruption
reported. Indeed, the spread of information about government con-
duct can provide either a positive or negative shock to the expected
electoral results, depending on citizens’ prior beliefs about the qual-
ity of the government (Besley, 2007). On the one hand, we find
that there is a decrease in the candidates’ average education of
nearly 4.5months of schooling when low levels of corruption are
reported (i.e., lower than the median). On the other hand, we find
an increase of nearly 4months of schooling when substantial cor-
ruption is reported (i.e., higher than the median). In other words,
there is a difference of 8.5months of schooling depending on the
results of the audit, which corresponds to about 30–35% of one stan-
dard deviation. When considering politicians’ income, we find that
a negative popularity shock significantly affects the average income
of the pool of candidates. The average income increases by 7.6%
among all candidates and by 9.6% among freshmen. These symmet-
ric results are not surprising in a context where trust in politics is
very low, and releasing information about the absence of corruption
could be more unexpected than the opposite.7 The effect is of a simi-
lar magnitude when considering the sample of freshmen candidates
or when we look at the median level of education. Interestingly, the
effect is larger when we constrain our analysis to municipalities that
have easier access to information due to the existence of local radio
stations. Indeed, our findings are confirmed when using a different
proxy for candidates’ ability, i.e., individuals’ main occupation. How-
ever, we do not find any change in other observable characteristics
such as age and gender. Moreover, the undesirable selection of low
ability candidates in municipalities that experience a positive pop-
ularity shock fades away the closer the release of the audit report
is to the election. Finally, we find that changing the composition of
the candidate pool does not have a significant effect on electoral out-
comes. In fact, voters still punish corrupt parties, in particular where
local radio stations are available, and the elected candidates do not
appear to have different characteristics compared to those elected in
municipalities where the report was released outside the selection
period.
To our knowledge, we are the first to estimate the effect of pop-
ularity shocks about the incumbent government on the quality of
political candidates. Our findings are closely related to the recent
literature that emphasizes that the characteristics of the electoral
race affect candidate selection. This could be caused by a change in
either individuals’ incentives to enter politics or parties’ incentives
to select particular types of candidates (Caselli and Morelli, 2004;
Galasso and Nannicini, 2011). Our interpretation of the results is
more in line with studies that emphasize the role of the demand for
politicians (i.e., party selection) than those that focus on the supply
of politicians (i.e., self-selection of individuals). For instance, Galasso
and Nannicini (2011) focus on parties’ role in selecting candidates.
Studying the Italian parliamentarian elections, they show that bet-
ter candidates (i.e., those with more years of schooling) are selected
in districts where the electoral race is expected to be more compet-
itive. Mattozzi and Merlo (2015) further show that the incentives
to select high-ability candidates crucially depend on the electoral
system. Specifically, high-ability candidates are less likely to be cho-
sen in proportional than in majoritarian systems, as the latter are
characterized by a higher level of electoral competitiveness. Like-
wise, Esteve-Volart and Bagues (2012), studying Senate and House
6 We reach a similar conclusion when studying mayoral candidates, though with
less statistical power.
7 Brazilians have very low confidence in political parties. More than 85% of the
individuals interviewed in the 6th wave of the World Values Survey (2010–2014)
responded that they have little or no confidence at all in political parties.
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elections in Spain, find that parties tend to select female candidates
where they are less likely to be elected.
A second group of studies instead focuses on the supply side,
showing that both monetary and non-monetary incentives might
affect individuals’ decision to enter politics. Kotakorpi and Poutvaara
(2011), Ferraz and Finan (2009) and Gagliarducci and Nannicini
(2013) show that higher salaries attract more educated individuals
to politics in Finland, Brazil and Italy, respectively. Daniele and Geys
(2015) and Daniele (2017) exploit shocks in the presence of criminal
organizations in Italianmunicipalities to show that educated individ-
uals drop out of politics when criminal groups are stronger, as they
decrease the expected payoffs from politics (Dal Bó et al., 2006).8
Further, we complement the literature on political scandals. For
instance, Ferraz and Finan (2008) focus on random audits in Brazil-
ianmunicipalities to show that publicly exposed corrupt incumbents
are less likely to be re-elected in the next election. In addition, Sny-
der and Hirano (2012) show that in US House elections, incumbents
involved in scandals have a higher probability of losing their primary
elections, and receive fewer votes in general elections compared to
non-scandal incumbents. Chong et al. (2015) show that voters punish
both incumbents and challengers after receiving information about
the inefficient use of public funds in Mexico. Finally, Bobonis et al.
(2016) find that foreseeable anti-corruption audits reduce corruption
in the short-term, as they have a disciplining effect on the incum-
bent. In a similar vein, we find that the incumbent strategically reacts
to the release of corruption news selecting different candidates.
Our results also contribute to the recent literature on the conse-
quences of Brazil’s randomized auditing policy. While Litschig and
Zamboni (2013) show that increasing the audit risk reduces rent
extraction, Avis et al. (2016) confirm that the audits reduce corrup-
tion in both the intervened municipalities and their neighbours.9
Further, Ferraz and Finan (2008), Brollo et al. (2013) andMuço (2016)
show that releasing the audit reports indeed has an effect on electoral
outcomes.10 Politicians seem to anticipate this potential electoral
punishment by reducing malfeasance when they are eligible for re-
election (Ferraz and Finan, 2011). Instead, Brollo et al. (2013) hint
that auditing policy has an impact on political selection: they show
that the disclosure of the audit reports affects not only the mayor’s
likelihood of re-election but also the probability that he or she will
run for re-election. Muço (2016) finds that municipal audits influ-
ence federal elections. Voters also reduce their support for the party
of the incumbent mayor when voting in presidential elections. This
result emphasizes that party labels matter in Brazil.11
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our
main hypothesis. Section 3 describes the institutional setting. In
Sections 4 and 5 and , we present the data and estimation strategy,
respectively. The main results and additional tests are reported in
Sections 6 and 7. We conclude in Section 8.
2. Hypothesis
In this section, we provide a brief explanation of ourmain hypoth-
esis and clarify its underlying assumptions.
As explained above, we depart from the literature on the vot-
ing effects of popularity shocks, which concentrates on whether
voters hold politicians accountable. We instead focus on the idea
8 Finally, Baltrunaite et al. (2014) show that gender quotas increase the presence
of (female) educated politicians. However, they do not discuss whether this is mostly
driven by a change in the supply of or demand for educated politicians.
9 Galletta (2017) provides similar evidence studying the strengthening of law
enforcement against corruption in Italian local governments.
10 These results are relevant to our study, as they provide additional support to
the critical assumption that auditing disclosure affects voters’ decisions.
11 Samuels and Zucco (2014) reach a similar conclusion, as they find that Brazilians
conform their opinions on public policy to those of the parties they support.
that parties select candidates they expect to be popular with vot-
ers. Our main hypothesis is that, as selecting high-ability candidates
is costly, political parties will strategically pick them depending
on their expected likelihood of winning the election. Specifically, a
positive popularity shock that increases the chances of winning an
election will reduce the propensity to select appealing, high-ability
candidates. A negative popularity shock will have the opposite effect,
which increases parties’ motivation to select high-ability and compe-
tent candidates. This reasoning is based on the validity of three main
assumptions.
First, it assumes that voters value candidates’ ability when cast-
ing their vote. Indeed, there is a large literature showing that voters
primarily care about competence when picking an elected officer
(Kinder et al., 1980; Todorov et al., 2005). Importantly, there is also
empirical evidence that education – which we use as a proxy for
competence – is a valid predictor of electoral success (Dal Bó et
al., 2017). Our findings confirm this evidence. Appendix Table OA.1
shows that, after controlling for city fixed effects and other individ-
ual characteristics, educated candidates are much more likely to be
elected.
Second, this hypothesis assumes that selecting high-ability can-
didates is costly for a political party. Several papers corroborate the
idea that a lack of incentives might limit the number of good citi-
zens who choose to enter politics (Caselli andMorelli, 2004; Messner
and Polborn, 2004). In fact, parties might benefit from selecting low-
ability politicians, for example if they provide higher rents for the
party or/and have a lower reservation wage (Besley, 2005; Dal Bó et
al., 2006). Conversely, parties might select better candidates when
an election is more competitive in order to maximize their chances
of winning (Galasso and Nannicini, 2011; Mattozzi and Merlo, 2015).
In line with these findings, in a recent working paper on Brazilian
local politics, Colonnelli et al. (2017) show that there is a trade-off
between education and party loyalty in the probability that party
supporters will have a public-sector job. Finally, we find that edu-
cated candidates receive more party funds with which to finance
their electoral campaigns, which suggests that selecting high-ability
candidates is costlier for political parties (Appendix Table OA.1).
Third, our hypothesis is valid in a political system in which
political parties play a relevant role in selecting candidates, which
depends on the country’s institutional framework. In the next
section, we provide evidence of the crucial role that Brazilian politi-
cal parties play in local elections.
Our reasoning thus far has focused on an incumbent coalition that
is directly hit by a shock. Yet the effect of a shock could spill over
and affect the challenger’s decision making. In this case, it is less
clear what we should expect. In absence of a popularity shock, each
coalition will rationally select the best pool of candidates conditional
on the candidates picked by the opponents (i.e., Nash-equilibrium).
A popularity shock affects this equilibrium as the incumbent will
expect an electoral punishment/reward. In a first case, the chal-
lenger might expect the incumbent to lose (gain) votes (depending
upon the type of shock), and thus she finds convenient to select a
pool of candidates with lower (higher) quality. However, if the chal-
lenger strategically anticipates the incumbent reaction to the shock,
she will expect that the competitor new pool of candidates leaves
her chances of victory unchanged compared to the pre-shock Nash-
equilibrium. Therefore, in this case, the challenger will not adjust her
political selection.
3. Institutional setting
3.1. Local institutions and electoral rules
Brazil is a federation with three levels of government. In addition
to the federal government, there are 26 states and 5565 municipal-
ities. Citizens choose the executive and the legislative branches of
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each jurisdiction through direct elections. Local governments have a
central role in the provision of a variety of public goods (e.g., primary
education, culture, health care, housing, transportation and munici-
pal infrastructure). Transfers from upper levels of government cover
a significant proportion of these expenditures.
At the municipal level, the mayor (Prefeito) has executive power
while the city council (Caˆmara de Vereadores) exercises legislative
power. The number of seats for councilors in each city council is
based on population size.12 Mayors and city councilors are both
elected for a term of 4 years, but while mayors are limited to two
terms, city councilors have no term limits. The mayor plays a cen-
tral role in defining the expenditure programs, and the city council
is responsible for enacting municipality laws and overseeing the
mayor’s usage of public resources. Indeed, councilors have influ-
ence over the allocation of funds, for instance by proposing petitions,
amendments, and voting on the municipal budget proposal.
In municipal elections, voters are provided with a list of candi-
dates running for mayor, at most one for each party (or coalition of
parties), and a list of candidates for city councilor indicating which
party they support.13 Voters can cast one vote formayor and one vote
for councilor. Alternatively, voters can select a party in the city coun-
cil election without specifying a candidate. While mayors are elected
with a majority of votes, councilor elections use an open-list pro-
portional system, and the distribution of seats follows the d’Hondt
method. This means that the number of seats assigned to a party in
the city council depends on howmany votes all candidates from that
party received. However, for each party, only the candidates with the
most votes will become city councilors.
3.2. Party organization and the candidate selection process
Importantly for our study, political parties play a significant role
in selecting candidates to run in local elections (Mainwaring, 1999;
Guarnieri, 2011; Avelino et al., 2012). Only parties registered with
the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) within one year before the elec-
tions can present candidates. Almost 30 different parties presented
candidates in the 2004 and 2008 elections. However, the five biggest
parties accounted for more than 65% of all mayors elected in the
2004 and 2008 elections. A similar time constraint applies to citi-
zens who want to register to run in the mayoral or city councilor
elections. They need to have their voting residency in the district
they would like to represent and to be affiliated with their sup-
porting political party for at least one year before the election. The
electoral law requires parties to nominate candidates during local
conventions, but it does not define how these conventions need to
be organized or how candidates should be selected, delegating com-
plete autonomy to the executive committee of each party. In the
2004 and 2008 municipal elections, parties had to choose their can-
didates and coalitions in a party caucus from June 10 to 30 of the
election year.14 Final candidate lists had to be registered with the
TSE before July 5.15 The maximum number of candidates a coalition
can put forward is twice the total number of seats it holds in the city
12 Local laws define the exact number of seats, but they have to follow federal laws
that set the limit of seats according to the population in the municipality (Art. 29 of
1988 Brazilian Federal Constitution.). The number of seats ranges from a minimum of
9 in municipalities with less than fifteen thousand inhabitants, and a maximum of 55
in those with more than eight million people.
13 Municipal elections are held in different years than federal and state elections.
14 These elections were held on October 3, 2004 and October 5, 2008.
15 Changes to the electoral law (Law No. 9504, of 30 September 1997) in 2015
affected some of the elements we exploit in our analysis. Beginning with the 2016
municipal elections: (1) party conventions are required to take place from July 20
to August 5 in election years; (2) candidate lists must be submitted by August 14
and (3) candidates must be affiliated with a political party for at least 6months
before election day.
council.16 The parties must put forward a minimum of 30% female
candidates.
Although local conventions formally control the candidate selec-
tion process, national and regional party bodies can influence it,
depending on the party statute (Avelino et al., 2012; Ribeiro, 2013a,b;
Guarnieri, 2011). These differ across parties depending on the num-
ber of eligible voters and onwhether the system is based on elections
or direct appointment. Some parties select candidates in regional or
national committees, so local candidates do not have to go through
an approval process. In other parties, every candidate is elected by
vote, and thus presumably no higher party body can modify the
candidate list. Following this classification, Guarnieri (2011) labels
three types of parties:17 monocratic, oligarchic and polyarchic. In
monocratic parties, the decision-making process is in the hands of
a single group that has an absolute majority of votes and absolute
control over party decisions. This group includes the Partido Trabal-
hista Brasileiro (PTB) and the Partido Progressista (PP). In oligarchic
parties, a small number of groups control a considerable proportion
of votes. While no single group can control the party on its own,
the small number of groups facilitates coordination, increasing the
cohesion and stability of the coalition. This group includes the Par-
tido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB), the Partido Democrático
Trabalhista (PDT) and the Democratas (DEM). In polyarchic parties,
the organization ismore decentralized. The decisionmaking depends
on constant negotiations and discussions across and within differ-
ent party layers and bodies. Both the cohesion and the stability of
coalitions comprised of such groups are likely to be more precarious.
This last group includes the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) and the
Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB).18
To conclude, the Brazilian (local) candidates selection process
appears a multifaceted one, where both local and high level party
branches play a role. Importantly for our hypothesis, we face a
selection process characterized by a central role of political parties.
3.3. The Brazilian anti-corruption program
In 2003, the Brazilian national government, led by Luís Inácio
Lula da Silva, established an innovative anti-corruption program to
improve the transparency of public spending and to tackle corrup-
tion in local governments. The Controladoria Geral da União (CGU),
a federal agency, was made responsible for auditing local spend-
ing that has been funded with federal transfers.19 Importantly for
our analysis, municipalities are randomly selected to the audit-
ing process. Lotteries are held every two or three months in the
Caixa Econômica Federal, in Brasília, in the presence of the media
and members of civil society. Only municipalities with more than
500,000 inhabitants are exempt from the lottery. Further, since lot-
teries are run independently for each state, the probability of being
selected for an audit in a given year varies by state. The first lottery
selected 26 municipalities. From the second lottery to the eighth, 50
municipalities were selected each time; 60 municipalities have been
chosen since the ninth lottery.
16 If a party is not in a coalition, the number of candidates cannot be more than
150% of the total number of seats it holds in the city council. Further, if not all
candidates are selected during the party convention, party leaders may fill the
remaining vacancies within 60days of the election.
17 Other scholars reach similar conclusions on classifying Brazilian parties (Ribeiro,
2013a,b).
18 Other mechanisms, such as party affiliations, also influence the candidate selec-
tion process. Party leaders can deliberately withdraw existing affiliations or deny new
ones (Guarnieri, 2011). Another mechanism is to replace, due to irregularities, a local
committee with a provisional one directly under the control of a national/regional
party committee. Indeed, there are many cases of replacements for reasons that are
not clearly stated in the statute (Guarnieri, 2011).
19 CGU Decree No. 247, June 20, 2003.
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Table 1
Corruption by electoral term.
Percentile
N Mean 25% 50% 75% 99%
Term 2001–2004 1299 0.0462 0 0.001 0.049 0.532
Term 2005–2008 709 0.0561 0 0.017 0.068 0.465
Notes: This table reports information about the revealed corruption over the term
2001–2004 and 2005–2008.
For each selected municipality, the CGU compiles a list of all fed-
eral transfers received since 2001. Typically, 10 to 15 auditors spend
around two weeks in the municipal offices searching for poten-
tial anomalies. Once the auditors have completed the inspections,
they prepare a report listing any irregularities and malpractices. The
report is then sent to competent authorities for prosecution and
made publicly available on the CGU website about 3months later. As
shown by Ferraz and Finan (2008), the results of the audits generally
receive media attention, especially at the local level.
4. Data
To estimate the effect of corruption disclosure on the quality of
the pool of candidates, we collect information about Brazilianmunic-
ipalities from a variety of sources for the period 2001–2010, which
covers two full municipal terms (i.e., 2001–2004 and 2005–2008).20
Information about municipal-level corruption is taken from
Brollo et al. (2013). Their data contain different measures of cor-
ruption for all 1481 municipalities selected in the first 29 lotteries
of the anti-corruption program (i.e., audits disclosed from July 2003
to March 2010). We use a broad definition of corruption that also
includes irregularities that could be interpreted as government mis-
management rather than true corruption events.21 This definition
includes illegal procurement practices and the diversion of funds
— not justifiable payments.22 To account for the different levels of
corruption across municipalities, our analysis uses the variable Cor-
ruption, which represents the amount of misappropriated funds as a
proportion of the total amount audited.23 This information is avail-
able for only 1422 municipalities, as it was not possible to compute
the amount of resources involved in some irregularities. The level of
observation is the municipality-term, meaning that we can clearly
identify the term during which electoral irregularities took place. In
other words, if a municipality was selected in a lottery in 2007, it will
likely appear in the sample twice, as the auditors checked spending
that occurred in both the 2001–2004 term and the first part of the
2005–2008 term. We present in Table 1 the summary statistics of
Corruption divide by electoral term.
We use candidates’ level of education as a proxy for quality.
Specifically, we consider the minimum number of years necessary
to attain a certain degree.24 Alternatively, we use the share of can-
didates that completed Mandatory School. The TSE provides data on
the level of education of candidates for the city council. For each
municipality, we distinguish between the Average Education level
20 Table OA.2 reports summary statistics of the variables described below.
21 Therefore, in our analysis we do not distinguish between active and passive waste
(Bandiera et al., 2009), as we rely on the fact that both types of misbehaviors might be
salient for electoral accountability.
22 The dataset and full details on how the measure is constructed are available at
https://sites.google.com/site/fernandabrollo/home/data.
23 In the original dataset, this variable is called Broad Fraction of the Amount. Note
that we do not consider a binary measure of corruption as in the Brazilian context,
the presence of corruption might not be informative per se, conversely we exploit the
severity of the phenomenon. See Section 1 and the footnote 5.
24 For candidates who started a degree but eventually dropped out, we assign half
the number of years that would be needed to complete it.
of candidates in the incumbent’s and the challengers’ coalitions.
The incumbent’s coalition includes candidates from all the parties
that run in the same coalition as the incumbent mayor’s party and
who belonged to the winning coalition in the previous municipal
election.25 The challengers’ coalition includes candidates running for
all other parties. As an additional measure of quality, we consider
candidates’ job. That is, we associate to each candidate the aver-
age national salary correspondent to her profession and we compute
coalitions’ Average Income.
Further, we compute the same variable considering new candi-
dates (i.e., those who were not city councilors in the previous term)
and re-running candidates. We also take into account the Median
Education level of candidates and two other characteristics relevant
for political selection — the Share of Female candidates and Average
Age.26
We compute similar measures for mayoral candidates, but focus
only on candidates belonging to the same party as the incumbent.
Finally, we consider the Share of Seats Won by candidates elected
from the incumbent’s coalition.
We control for local political preferences by creating a dummy
variable that equals 1 if a mayor from Partido dos Trabalhadores led
the incumbent government, and 0 otherwise. This variable also con-
trols for whether the municipalities is ruled by the same party in
power at the federal government.
The 2000 Brazilian Census provides data about the Population
of the municipality, monthly per capita Income, Share of Population
Employed, the Gini Coefficient of income, the Share of population with
a Secondary Degree, the Share of Population in Urban areas, the share
of population working in different job sectors (Services, Transport,
Public and Commerce). We also construct a dummy variable Media,
which accounts for the presence of local radio stations in the munici-
pal area. This information is taken from the 2006municipality survey
Perfil dos Municípios Brasileiros: Cultura.
To provide homogeneous results in all our estimates, we apply
a sequence of restrictions to the original dataset on corruption pro-
vided by Brollo et al. (2013). First, we remove eight municipalities,
as they did not yet exist in 2000 when the population census was
conducted. Second, we consider only municipalities in which at
least some parties support the incumbent’s coalition. Therefore, we
remove 88 more municipalities. Finally, we exclude five municipal-
ities in which there were no new candidates for city councilor (i.e.,
they were all incumbents). Clearly, by applying these restrictions the
sample of municipalities we use in our analysis is no longer random,
therefore we face potential limit in the generalization of our results.
We partially reduce these concerns in Section 6.3.
5. Estimation strategy
The main objective of this study is to test whether informa-
tion shocks that change citizens’ voting behavior affect the quality
of electoral candidates selected by parties. Specifically, we want to
compare (1) the ability of candidates running for city council when
the local government experiences an informative shock during the
party selection period to (2) the ability of candidates running for city
council in local governments that experience a similar informative
shock at other points in time. In order to provide a reliable coun-
terfactual analysis, we exploit the randomness of the timing of the
disclosure of the audit reports to determine the group of Treated vs.
Controlmunicipalities.
25 We also show in Appendix Table OA.2 our main results by defining the incum-
bent coalition as composed of all parties that belonged to the winning coalition in the
previous municipal election.
26 We also construct the two latter variables and the Average Education level for the
sample of elected candidates.
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Fig. 1. Treated and control definition.
To precisely determine the selection period (and hence the compo-
sition of the two different groups), we identify two important dates
in the electoral process. First, we account for the deadline for par-
ties to provide their candidate lists (i.e., July 5, 2004 for the elections
held in October 2004 and July 5, 2008 for the October 2008 elec-
tions). Second, we consider the cutoff date for citizens to be affiliated
with a party in order to run as a candidate for that party (i.e., October
3, 2003 for the October 2004 elections and October 5, 2007 for the
elections held in October 2008). Thus, a municipality is considered
to be treated if the disclosure of the report occurred between 12
and 3months before election day. Indeed, depending on the lottery
results, the communication of the audit reports might occur during,
before or after what we identify as the treatment period. We think
our definition makes clear that the focus on parties’ role in the selec-
tion process as the group of citizens willing to run for public office is
mostly predetermined by the time the reports are disclosed.
It is worth noting that our strategy closely follows the one used
in Ferraz and Finan (2008). However, as we are exploring a distinct
research question, our definition of treatment and the way we split
the sample between treated and control municipalities are rather
different. Indeed, Ferraz and Finan (2008) define treated municipal-
ities as those that received an auditing disclosure anytime before
the election. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, we provide
results where we use this latter definition of the treatment group.
By doing so, on the one hand, we loosen the focus on parties’ role in
the selection process as now the group of citizens that can become
eligible to run for election is not predetermined. For example, citi-
zens can decide to enroll in a political party as a response to an audit
report published more than 12months before the election, while
this would not be taken into account with our primary definition
of treatment. On the other hand, we control for the possibility
that receiving a popularity shock in the three months before the
election causes the withdraw from the electoral competition of pre-
viously selected candidates. For instance, political candidates from
the incumbent political party that experience a very negative popu-
larity shock might withdraw from the electoral competition so that
the incumbent party may replace these candidates. Related to this
point, we also report results where we exclude from the analysis
municipalities that had the auditing disclosed more than 12months
before elections. We do so given that it is not straightforward to
think of them as part of the control group as the informational shocks
occurred before the end of the selection period.27
Another aspect to take into account is that auditing reports reveal
a misuse of public funds that could cover both terms we include
in our analysis. This could be a problem if it were not possible to
determine the exact timing of the misbehavior. In this were the
case, citizens would be limited in their judgment as it would be
less clear who was accountable for the discoveries made during the
27 In summary, the auditing disclosedmore than 12months before elections are used
as part of the control group in Table 4, as part of the treated group in Table 6 and
excluded from the sample in Appendix Table OA.3.
audit. Luckily, the corruption data we use categorize the misuse of
public funds by term and municipality, which allows us to identify
the treated and control groups for each term as reported in Fig. 1.
Table 2 summarizes the sample composition, differentiating
accordingly to the time of the disclosure of the auditing report.
Over the two terms, we have 1695 observations. Following our main
definition of treatment: 327 are treated (19.3% of the sample) and
1368 are controls (80.7% of the sample).28 We have 182 treated
and 960 control municipalities for the 2001–2004 term. Here, the
treated municipalities are the ones drawn from the four lotteries
disclosed between October 2003 and April 2004, while the control
group includes all municipalities selected in the other 25 lotteries
that had audit reports released in the 2001–2004 term. For the 2005–
2008 term, we have 145 treated and 408 control municipalities.
The treated municipalities were drawn from the three lotteries dis-
closed between January 2008 and June 2008, while the control group
comprises all municipalities selected from the six lotteries disclosed
between February 2006 and July 2007 plus the four lotteries dis-
closed between December 2008 and March 2010 that were audited
for federal funds released in the 2005–2008 term.29
Table 3 reports the summary statistics for the two groups of
municipalities.
When focusing on the control variables, our sample seems well
balanced. Only the share of the population working in the indus-
trial sector is different between the two groups at the 5% significance
level. Note that including this variable in our specifications does not
affect our findings.
However, as clearly highlighted by these tests, the level of
detected corruption is higher for municipalities in the treated group
(mean 6.8%) compared to the ones in the control group (mean 4.4%).
The difference is statistically significant. Nevertheless, we believe
that these results do not limit the reliability of our analysis: this evi-
dence would be problematic only if the auditors behave differently
depending on the expected time of the release of the report, i.e.,
before/after the deadline to submit candidates’ lists. Conversely, this
would not have any impact on our analysis if this happens by chance.
Indeed, in the latter scenario, our results would be unaffected, as our
estimation essentially performs a comparison between municipali-
tieswith a similar level of corruption that differ only by the disclosure
timing, which is random by construction. In favor of this interpreta-
tion, we highlight that: i) previous studies (Ferraz and Finan, 2008;
Litschig and Zamboni, 2013) have extensively defended the idea that
auditors did not behave strategically in their reports ii) this signif-
icant difference arises only in one electoral term (2001–2004) and
28 Instead, if we consider the Ferraz and Finan’s (2008) definition, wewould have 905
treated observations (43.4% of the sample) and 790 as controls (46.6% of the sample).
29 The reports disclosed before February 2006 did not account for funds released in
the 2005–2008 term. 374 municipalities appear in the sample twice, as they are part
of the control group for the first term and part of either the control or treated group
in the second term. Municipalities that were audited more than once appear in our
sample only with reference to the first draw. In this way, we avoid the possibility that
the potential long-term effects of the audit would bias our estimates (Avis et al., 2016).
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Table 2
Sample details.
Term 2001 Term 2005 Total
Before elections More than 12months before election 68 242 310
Between 12months and 3months to election 182 145 327
From 3months before election 93 0 93
After elections 799 166 965
Total 1142 553 1695
Notes: The table reports details on the sample of 1321 municipalities considered in our analysis. The level of observation is
municipality-term.
it can be narrowed down to two lotteries 5 and 3, which report
respectively very high/low levels of corruption far/close from/to the
deadline to submit candidates’ lists. The exclusion of such lotteries
substantially reduces the differences in corruption (65% reduction)
between audits released before/after the elections, while not affect-
ing our findings; iii) it is also important to stress that although the
auditors know the day in which they audit a certain municipality,
there is uncertainty on when they will be released. In fact, the num-
ber of days from a lottery to the release of the report goes from
a minimum of 53 to a maximum of 355days with an average of
190days. This reduces the scope for manipulating the audit depend-
ing on the timing of release; iv) corruption levels are different in
levels between audits released before/after the elections, but they
do not differ in terms of their probability of being above/below the
median. Therefore, this would not affect the assignments of munic-
ipalities to the treated or the control group, when focusing on this
measure. Our findings, as shown in the next section, are indeed
mostly driven by comparing municipalities above/below the median
level of corruption.
We now turn to our main estimation strategy. Formally, we start
the analysis by estimating the following ordinary least squares (OLS)
model:
Yist = b Tist + dXi + cs + kt + 4ist , (1)
where i denotes the municipality, s the state and t the term. Yist can
be the Average Year of Schooling of either all or freshmen candidates
for city councilor, from either the incumbent or the challenger coali-
tion. Tist is a dummy taking a value of 1 for municipalities with audit
reports released during the selection period (i.e., from 12 to 3months
before the election), while Xi is a set of time-invariant municipal
controls. Finally, cs are state-fixed effects, kt are term-fixed effects
and 4is is the error term. We use an OLS model with standard errors
clustered at the municipality level.
Thanks to the random assignment of the auditing among munic-
ipalities, the coefficient b is the causal parameter of interest. In
other words, it represents the average effect of the release of the
auditing reports on candidates’ education levels. State-fixed effects
are included in all specifications, since the random assignment was
stratified at the state level. Therefore, we ensure that our identifica-
tion accounts for the heterogeneous probability of selection on the
treatment faced by municipalities from different states. In addition,
term-fixed effects account for other unobservable characteristics
that might have changed from one term to the next. We include
municipal controls in order to providemore precise estimates in case
the randomization still produces a selection of treated and controlled
municipalities with unbalanced characteristics.
We expect the estimates from Eq. (1) to produce significant
results if the auditing disclosure per sematters in the candidate selec-
tion process, regardless of the actual information provided. However,
this would only be the case if the information disclosed differs from
what the voters or parties expect (Ferraz and Finan, 2008) — i.e., if
there is a systematic under- or over-estimation of a municipality’s
level of corruption.
Therefore, we refine our baseline analysis by taking into account
the results of the auditing process. We produce different estimations
to test whether the effect of the disclosure on the selection of candi-
dates depends on the kind of information reported. Specifically, we
estimate the following equation:
Yist = b1 Tist × Corruptionist + b2 Tist + b3 Corruptionist (2)
+dXi + cs + kt + 4ist ,
where Corruptionist is the share of corrupted resources. Moreover,
to provide more flexible estimations and to account for potential
non-linearity of the effects, we interact T with a variable identifying
municipalities that belong to different quartiles of the distribution
of corruption. In other words, we compare the effect of the disclo-
sure of different levels of corruption on the level of education of
the pool of candidates. This is a crucial point because, depending on
the level of corruption revealed, the information shock could send
either a positive or negative message to citizens. However, using this
approach could raise important issues if our measure of corruption
simply serves as a proxy for other municipal conditions. We check
for this possibility in Section 7.
6. Results
6.1. Baseline analysis
In this section, we report our central results.30 Specifically,
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 show the results from the estimates of
Eq. (1), in which the dependent variable measures the level of edu-
cation of all candidates in the incumbent’s coalition. As expected, the
disclosure of reports per se has no direct effect on candidates’ qual-
ity. Moreover, the inclusion of municipal covariates does not seem
to have a sizable impact on the main coefficient, which is in line
with a balanced sample thanks to the randomization of the treat-
ment. The remaining columns of Table 4 report estimates of Eq. (2).
Columns (3) to (5) report the effect of the auditing, interacted with
the level of corruption, on the education of all candidates selected
by the incumbent coalition’s parties. Column (3) provides the first
indication that reporting high corruption boosts the quality of can-
didates put forward by the incumbent’s party. The interaction term
has a positive sign, but it is not statistically significantly different
from 0. Column (4) reports the estimate where the treatment status
variable interacts with a dummy that identifies whether a munici-
pality is in the top 50th percentile of the distribution of our measure
of corruption.31 This result, coherently with Column (3), suggests
30 The results of various robustness tests are described in Section 7.
31 The level of corruption in the median municipality was 0.5%. Note that our results
are confirmed when considering as low level of corruption only cities without any
corruption event.
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Table 3
Differences in the audit outcomes and observable characteristics.
Control group Treated group Difference
(1) (2) (3)
Audit outcomes (term)
Corruption (2001–2004/ 2005–2008) 0.044 0.068 −0.024∗∗∗
Above median corruption (2001–2004/ 2005–2008) 0.489 0.544 −0.055*
Corruption (2001–2004) 0.041 0.076 −0.035***
Above median corruption (2001–2004) 0.490 0.555 −0.065
Corruption (2005–2008) 0.050 0.057 −0.007
Above median corruption (2005–2008) 0.488 0.531 −0.043
Observable characteristics
Average education in t − 1 (incumbent) 9.324 9.348 −0.024
Average education in t − 1 (challenger) 9.262 9.165 0.097
Dummy party incumbent PT 0.215 0.202 0.013
Population 26516 23511 3004
Income 581.668 573.920 7.749
Share of pop. employed 37.720 37.313 0.408
Gini coefficient 0.560 0.558 0.002
Avg. municipal number of years of education 3.568 3.483 0.085
Share of pop. in public administration 2.109 2.196 −0.087
Share of pop. in agriculture 16.390 16.792 −0.403
Share of pop. in industry 4.038 3.592 0.446∗∗
Share of pop. in service 6.705 6.551 0.154
Share of pop. in commerce 7.584 7.327 0.257
Share of pop. in transport 1.175 1.137 0.038
Share of pop. in service 6.705 6.551 0.154
Notes: This table displays the mean characteristics of 1321 municipalities (1695 municipality-term observations) that were audited by the Controladoria
Geral da União (CGU) in the period 2003–2009 (i.e., from the 2nd to the 29th lottery). The control group (column 1) is composed by 994 municipalities
which had disclosed the results of the auditing concerning the term 2001–2004 either before the 5th of Oct 2003 or after the 5th of Jul 2004, or had
disclosed the results of the auditing concerning the term 2005–2008 after the 5th of Jul 2008 or before the 3rd of Oct 2007. Instead, the treated group
(column 2) is composed by 327municipalities which had disclosed the results of the auditing from 12 to 3months before the elections (i.e., from one year
before elections to the 5th of July 2004 or 2008). Column (3) shows the difference of the means and the level of significance.
∗ p < 0.1.
∗∗ p < 0.05.
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
that when the audit report is disclosed during the selection period,
in municipalities with low levels of corruption candidates from
the incumbent’s coalition have around 4.5months less of schooling
(coeff. −0.378). However, if high levels of corruption are exposed, we
observe an increase in the average education of slightly more than
4months of schooling (coeff. 0.724 − 0.378 = 0.346). Both coef-
ficients are statistically significant. Therefore, there are more than
8.5months of education difference depending on the signal pro-
vided by the audit. This difference corresponds to about 30–35% of
one standard deviation.32 The coefficients in Column (5) indicate the
quartile of corruption and emphasize that the effect is stronger with
higher levels of reported corruption. The last three columns suggest
similar results once the focus is only on new candidates (i.e., those
whowere not previously on the city council). This is a crucial finding,
as using new candidates rules out the possibility that the estimates
rely on a mechanical effect coming from the direct consequences of
the audit (e.g., if the audit led to the incarceration of involved coun-
cilors who were mostly low-ability individuals). Table 5 shows that
the challenging coalition, which is not directly accountable for the
outcome of the audit, does not change the education levels of its
pool of candidates: the coefficients of interest are not statistically
32 Note that the magnitude of our findings is comparable with previous papers on
political selection. For instance, Daniele and Geys (2015) and Daniele (2017) estimate
a change in politicians’ education due to mafia presence of about 35% of a standard
deviation. Kotakorpi and Poutvaara (2011) find that a 35% increase in salary leads
to a 5-percentage-point increase in candidates with high education. Baltrunaite et
al. (2014) report a modest increase of 2–3months in politicians’ education after the
introduction of gender quotas.
significant in any of the regressions.33 As suggested in Section 2, the
effects of a popularity shock might spill on the challenger depending
on his believes about the reaction of the incumbent. Therefore, these
(lack of) results can be rationalized by a challenger (ex-ante) expect-
ing the incumbent to have a reaction strong enough to overcome the
popularity shock.
So far, we considered amunicipality to be treated if the disclosure
of the report occurred during the selection period that we define tak-
ing places between 12 and 3months before election day. However,
one can still think of amore general definition of treatment period by
considering as treated all municipalities that experience the disclo-
sure of the report before the election. Therefore, following Ferraz and
Finan (2008), we report in Table 6 the results from regressions where
now the treatment includes the entire pre-electoral period.34 From
Column 1 (all candidates) and Column 3 (freshmen), we still observe
that audits reporting a low level of corruption lead to a worse polit-
ical selection, while candidates’ ability increases in cities reporting
above median levels of corruption. However, in the latter case, the
magnitude of the estimated effect is lower than the one in Table 4.
In Columns 2 and 4, instead, we separate the pre-electoral period in
three parts: i) at least 12months before the elections; ii) between
3 and 12months before the elections; iii) between 0 and 3months
before the elections. It seems our results are driven uniquely by the
period in between 3 and 12months. Conversely, it appears that polit-
ical selection does not change when the audit is released far from
33 Our results are unchanged when considering the reaction of the most voted
challenging coalition, either in the previous or in the present elections.
34 Brollo et al. (2013) apply also a very similar identification strategy.
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Table 4
Audit releases and the quality of candidates — incumbent coalition.
All candidates New candidates
Linear Median Quartile Linear Median Quartile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pre-selection auditing 0.016 0.041 −0.073 −0.378∗∗ −0.429∗∗ −0.160 −0.448∗∗ −0.531∗∗
(0.134) (0.115) (0.131) (0.172) (0.194) (0.141) (0.191) (0.212)
Pre-selection auditing× corruption 1.567 1.796*
(0.993) (1.080)
Pre-selection auditing× above median corruption 0.724∗∗∗ 0.723∗∗∗
(0.235) (0.258)
Pre-selection auditing× second quartile of corruption 0.281 0.448
(0.393) (0.459)
Pre-selection auditing× third quartile of corruption 0.629∗∗ 0.691∗∗
(0.315) (0.333)
Pre-selection auditing× fourth quartile of corruption 0.899∗∗∗ 0.906∗∗∗
(0.280) (0.314)
Corruption 0.297 0.377
(0.452) (0.496)
Above median corruption −0.017 −0.004
(0.097) (0.109)
Second quartile −0.005 0.139
(0.202) (0.207)
Third quartile 0.002 0.040
(0.115) (0.132)
Fourth quartile −0.036 0.005
(0.126) (0.143)
F-test inter 0.181 0.012 0.078 0.142 0.025 0.107
R2 0.117 0.374 0.376 0.379 0.379 0.319 0.320 0.322
N observations 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality control variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is Average years of education of candidates – as a city councilor – from the incumbent coalition. Corruption is the share of the amount of the audited
budget involved in general violations. Municipality controls include: dummy party incumbent PT, ln(population), income, Gini coefficient, share of population with a secondary degree,
share of population employed, share of population working in agriculture, share of population working in industry share of population working in commerce, share of population working
in transport, share of population working in service and share of population working in the public administration. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis.
∗ p < 0.1.
∗∗ p < 0.05.
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
the elections (more than 12months). Also, audits released just before
the elections (less than 3months) do not affect candidates’ selection.
These results add credibility to our main definition of treatment.
Overall, our main result points to the effect of information on
shaping the selection of political candidates. Given the institutional
background of the case at the study, our preferred interpretation of
the empirical evidence is that political parties, rather than politi-
cians, do react to the expected electoral shocks. On the one hand,
they increase the quality of candidates in municipalities where elec-
tions become more difficult (i.e., where a severe report has been
released) and they need to increase their popularity. This is in line
with previous research showing that parties select better candidates
when they need them, namely during more competitive elections
(Galasso and Nannicini, 2011; Mattozzi and Merlo, 2015). Impor-
tantly, this intuition is supported by the suggestive results of Table
OA.1 and other more accurate studies showing that educated indi-
viduals are more likely to be elected (Dal Bó et al., 2017). On the
other hand, elections become less risky when the local government
experiences a positive shock, such as reporting no or little corrup-
tion. In this case, parties might decide to reduce the number of
high-ability individuals if they are costly. For example, this is possi-
ble if the party shares rents with selected candidates, and this rent
is higher the lower the public motivation (Besley, 2007), or if the
party has to supplement candidates’ salaries, as high-ability indi-
viduals have a higher reservation wage (Mattozzi and Merlo, 2008).
In our context, as highlighted in Table OA.1, more educated candi-
dates tend to receive a higher direct economic support from political
parties.
Below, we propose additional analyses that complement the
previous findings. We only report results that focus on parties that
support the incumbent, as we have already shown the absence of
effects for the challengers.
6.2. Additional analysis
6.2.1. A test on the role of political parties
Although we believe our results can likely be explained by par-
ties’ strategic behaviors, we cannot rule out the possibility that they
are also influenced by changes in the supply of politicians (i.e., the
pool of individuals willing to run for office). This potential effect
is already partially reduced because our treated municipalities can-
not select individuals who are external to the party. In other words,
the pool of potential candidates is predetermined with respect to
the treatment. Still, even within this sample of individuals, an effect
could be expected. However, in principle, citizen–candidate models
would predict results that are opposite to our findings (Caselli and
Morelli, 2004; Osborne and Slivinski, 1996). For instance, one might
expect high-ability individuals to have even lower incentives to enter
politics after a political scandal. Similarly, it is hard to explain why
high-ability candidates would refuse to stand for election in amunic-
ipality that appears to have a functioning administration, where it
would be easier to be elected. Therefore, the effect of the disclosure
of the audit report on individuals’ willingness to enter politics will, if
anything, adjust the size of our coefficients downward.
Toprovideadditionalsupport toour interpretation,wetest thehet-
erogeneity of the estimated effectwith respect to the power structure
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Table 5
Audit releases and the quality of candidates — challenger coalitions.
All candidates New candidates
Linear Median Quartile Linear Median Quartile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pre-selection auditing −0.043 −0.012 0.014 −0.034 −0.048 −0.026 −0.091 −0.114
(0.095) (0.075) (0.088) (0.112) (0.125) (0.090) (0.118) (0.133)
Pre-selection auditing× corruption −0.452 −0.602
(0.886) (0.845)
Pre-selection auditing× above median corruption 0.038 0.052
(0.150) (0.156)
Pre-selection auditing× second quartile of corruption 0.075 0.138
(0.266) (0.277)
Pre-selection auditing× third quartile of corruption 0.174 0.220
(0.191) (0.200)
Pre-selection auditing× fourth quartile of corruption −0.058 −0.054
(0.185) (0.193)
Corruption 0.246 0.309
(0.283) (0.297)
Above median corruption 0.010 0.013
(0.068) (0.069)
Second quartile 0.077 0.005
(0.127) (0.125)
Third quartile −0.017 −0.036
(0.084) (0.086)
Fourth quartile 0.067 0.069
(0.086) (0.088)
F-test inter 0.839 0.983 0.932 0.618 0.846 0.857
R2 0.172 0.515 0.515 0.515 0.515 0.499 0.499 0.500
N observations 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality control variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is Average years of education of candidates – as a city councilor – from the challenger coalitions. Corruption is the share of the amount of the audited
budget involved in general violations. Municipality controls include: dummy party incumbent PT, ln(population), income, Gini coefficient, share of population with a secondary degree,
share of population employed, share of population working in agriculture, share of population working in industry, share of population working in commerce, share of population working
in transport, share of population working in service and share of population working in the public administration. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis.
of themayor’s party. As explained in Section 3.2, in centralized parties
top and mid-level party leaders are the decision-makers, while ordi-
narymembershaveagreatervoice indecentralizedparties. Therefore,
we expect that changes in the supply side of politicians would affect
our results mostly when the popularity shock hits a decentralized
party. In other words, it is easier for individuals who are willing to
run for office to enter the pool of candidates of a decentralized rather
than a centralized party.
We operationalize such a measure of party organization by fol-
lowing Guarnieri’s (2011) definition and consider parties to be
decentralized if they are defined as polyarchic, and centralized if they
are classified as either oligarchic or monocratic. We investigate the
potential presence of a heterogeneous effect by splitting the sam-
ple into two groups depending on the incumbent mayor’s party of
affiliation and running separate regressions.35 Table 7 presents the
results from these regressions. In Columns (1) and (3), we consider
municipalities governed by centralized parties (i.e., PSDB, PDT, DEM,
PTB and PP), while in Columns (2) and (4) we use the sample of
municipalities ruled by decentralized parties (i.e., PT and PMDB). The
results tend to confirm our intuition. Indeed, we find a significant
change in the education of the selected candidates only when the
incumbent hit by the popularity shock was affiliated with a central-
ized party. Column (1) suggests that the presence of a positive shock
decreases the quality of the pool of candidates by nearly 4 months of
education (coeff. −0.374), though the coefficient is not significant. A
35 It is worth highlighting that the mayor’s party of affiliation in a given municipal-
ity is not randomly assigned, thus the following results are not intended to establish
causal relationships.
negative shock significantly increases the level of education by about
6months of schooling (coeff. 0.858 − 0.374 = 0.484). Column (3)
reports similar results for freshman candidates. In this case, a signifi-
cant, though negative, effect on candidate quality is also observed for
positive popularity shocks. In Columns (2) and (4), in which we limit
the analysis to decentralized parties, none of the coefficient esti-
mates is significantly different from 0. The signs are coherent with
previous findings, but the coefficients are smaller in size.
Finally, we add two alternative splits which we do not expect to
have an effect on party selection. In a first case, we split the sample
between left and right-wing parties, while in a second casewe look at
whether parties are aligned with the central government.36 In both
cases, we do not expect a systematic difference in the incumbent
reaction to a popularity shock, as in our context, party organization
should not be significantly correlated to ideology or party alignment.
Indeed, our results suggest that the disclosure of the audits trigger
responses from each of these different groups of parties, regardless
their ideological scale or their alignment to the central government.
These results are shown in Table 8, in which we split the sample
depending on these different categories.37
36 We use the definition of party’s ideology from Power and Zucco Jr (2009), and
political alignment from Brollo and Nannicini (2012). Specifically, left parties are
defined as: PC do B, PSB, PT, PPS and PDT; right parties are defined as: PL, PP, PTB, PFL
and DEM. Aligned local governments in the term 2001–2004 are municipalities ruled
by PT, PSB, PDT, PL, PTB, PPS, PV and PC. In the term 2005–2008, we consider as aligned
these same parties plus PMDB.
37 The results are similar when including the entire sample and considering the triple
interaction: Pre-selection auditing X Above median corruption X Type of parties (i.e.,
left/right or aligned/not-aligned).
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Table 6
Audit releases and the quality of candidates — before election.
All candidates New candidates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pre-election auditing −0.254* −0.376∗∗
(0.137) (0.151)
Pre-election auditing× above median corruption 0.372∗∗ 0.486∗∗
(0.181) (0.199)
Pre-election auditing (at least 12months before) −0.219 −0.374*
(0.178) (0.192)
Pre-election auditing (between 3 and 12months before) −0.436∗∗ −0.550∗∗∗
(0.182) (0.202)
Pre-election auditing (between 0 and 3months before) 0.076 0.030
(0.316) (0.329)
Pre-election auditing (at least 12months before)× above median corruption 0.087 0.278
(0.227) (0.246)
Pre-election auditing (between 3 and 12months before)× above median corruption 0.746∗∗∗ 0.797∗∗∗
(0.244) (0.270)
Pre-election auditing (between 0 and 3months before)× above median corruption −0.029 0.072
(0.417) (0.432)
Above median corruption −0.041 −0.047 −0.080 −0.088
(0.116) (0.117) (0.133) (0.133)
F-test inter 0.106 0.082 0.033 0.076
R2 0.376 0.379 0.320 0.322
N observations 1695 1695 1695 1695
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is Average years of education of candidates – as a city councilor – from the incumbent coalition. Corruption is the share of the amount of the audited
budget involved in general violations. Municipality controls include: dummy party incumbent PT, ln(population), income, Gini coefficient, share of population with a secondary degree,
share of population employed, share of population working in agriculture, share of population working in industry share of population working in commerce, share of population working
in transport, share of population working in service and share of population working in the public administration. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis.
∗ p < 0.1.
∗∗ p < 0.05.
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
6.2.2. Alternative dependent variables
We first repeat our main analysis on a different measure of candi-
dates quality. That is, instead of using candidates’ level of education
we focus on candidates’ job (Besley et al., 2017). We estimated each
candidate’s salary based on the average national salary of her pro-
fession, which we used to compute coalitions’ average salary.38 We
used the logarithm of the average income of the incumbent coali-
tion as the dependent variable. We report these new results in
Columns (1) and (6) of Table 9. Both columns report very similar
results: a negative popularity shock significantly increases the aver-
age income of the pool of candidates. The average income increase
by 7.6% (coeff. 0.117 − 0.041 = 0.076) among all candidates and
9.6% (coeff. 0.157 − 0.061 = 0.096) in the sample of freshman.
Hence our results are confirmed by this alternative measure of abil-
ity for the case of a negative shock. However, using this measure, we
cannot confirm that a positive popularity shock affects candidates’
selection.39
Second, we check whether the effect of the disclosure on candi-
dates’ average level of education was driven by a general increase (or
decrease) in the quality of the pool of candidates or whether it came
from the selection of a few very good (or bad) candidates. Therefore,
in Columns (2) and (7) of Table 9 we estimate Eq. (2) by using the
median level of education of candidates for city councilor as a depen-
dent variable. The estimates reveal that themedian level of education
is also significantly affected, in the same direction as in the main
38 We use data from the 2000 Brazilian Census to calculate the average salary of the
candidate’s occupation.
39 We find qualitatively very similar results, though we have larger standard errors,
when using the average of the logarithm or simply the average income as dependent
variable.
analysis. In particular, the disclosure of a positive report decreases
the level of median education by 5months (coeff . −0.431), while it
increases by 3 months (coeff. 0.690 − 0.431 = 0.259) when the
report is negative. The point estimates are similar when looking at
freshmen candidates. This is consistent with a general change in the
composition of the pool of candidates.
Third, we replicate the principal analysis looking at the education
of mayoral candidates. Therefore, the regression reported in Column
(3) of Table 9 considers only municipalities in which the party of the
incumbent mayor decided to present a candidate (either the incum-
bent mayor or a new candidate) in the next election. In Column (8),
we focus on the sub-sample of new candidates. Themain coefficients
are not statistically significantly different from 0, but their direc-
tion is consistent with the results for candidates for city councilors.40
The insignificant effect could be driven by two characteristics of the
mayoral race that make the statistical test weaker. First, there is low
variability in the pool of candidates from one term to the next, as
manymayors can run for re-election. This is not an issue if we look at
the results in Column (8), which pertain to new candidates. Indeed,
the effects are larger than those reported in Column (3) for incum-
bent mayors. The second characteristic that could be driving the
insignificant effect is the limited variability in the level of education
of mayoral candidates: they are usually highly educated, particularly
compared to the general population and city councilors (see Table
OA.2).
Finally, we explore the possibility that the disclosure might also
affect other candidate characteristics — namely age and gender,
which have been analyzed in previous studies on political selection
40 Recall that for mayor, instead of looking at the coalition, we focus on party
affiliation.
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Table 7
Audit releases and the quality of candidates — party organization.
All candidates New candidates
Centralized Decentralized Centralized Decentralized
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pre-selection auditing −0.563∗∗ −0.260* −0.771∗∗∗ −0.063
(0.231) (0.273) (0.253) (0.323)
Pre-selection auditing× above median corruption 0.927∗∗∗ 0.633 1.077∗∗∗ 0.240
(0.318) (0.430) (0.345) (0.505)
Above median corruption −0.003 −0.169 −0.040 −0.151
(0.125) (0.190) (0.146) (0.200)
F-test inter 0.016 0.513 0.008 0.887
R2 0.334 0.529 0.277 0.489
N observations 994 437 994 437
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is Average years of education of candidates – as a city councilor – from the incumbent coalition. Corruption is the share of the
amount of the audited budget involved in general violations. Municipality controls include: ln(population), income, Gini coefficient, share of population with
a secondary degree, share of population employed, share of population working in agriculture, share of population working in industry share of population work-
ing in commerce, share of population working in transport, share of population working in service and share of population working in the public administration.
Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis.
∗ p < 0.1.
∗∗ p < 0.05.
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 8
Audit releases and the quality of candidates — party orientation and alignment.
All candidates New candidates
Aligned Not aligned Left Right Aligned Not aligned Left Right
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pre-selection auditing 0.025 −0.592∗∗∗ −0.102 −0.623∗∗∗ −0.205 −0.723∗∗ −0.399 −0.778∗∗
(0.324) (0.202) (0.340) (0.233) (0.417) (0.318) (0.419) (0.356)
Pre-selection auditing× above median corruption 0.748* 0.672∗∗ 0.898∗∗ 0.609* 0.999* 0.802∗∗ 1.083* 0.834*
(0.428) (0.275) (0.455) (0.315) (0.576) (0.408) (0.584) (0.453)
Above median corruption 0.116 −0.059 0.065 −0.009 0.107 0.140 0.219 0.074
(0.162) (0.124) (0.187) (0.137) (0.223) (0.162) (0.240) (0.193)
F-test inter 0.013 0.028 0.115 0.051 0.016 0.054 0.073 0.123
R2 0.472 0.345 0.534 0.324 0.402 0.294 0.499 0.268
N observations 556 1139 305 645 556 1139 305 645
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is Average years of education of candidates – as a city councilor – from the incumbent coalition. Corruption is the share of the amount of the audited
budget involved in general violations. Municipality controls include: ln(population), income, Gini coefficient, share of population with a secondary degree, share of population employed,
share of population working in agriculture, share of population working in industry share of population working in commerce, share of population working in transport, share of population
working in service and share of population working in the public administration. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis.
∗ p < 0.1.
∗∗ p < 0.05.
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
(Esteve-Volart and Bagues, 2012; Daniele and Geys, 2015; De Paola
et al., 2010). We consider the average age of candidates and the share
of female candidates as dependent variables. Our findings, reported
in Columns (4 and 9) and (5 and 10) of Table 9, do not highlight any
substantial change concerning these characteristics.41
6.2.3. Timing of the disclosure
In this section, we test the heterogeneity of the effect of the dis-
closure depending on when it occurred to determine whether the
effect was mainly due to municipalities in which the audit report
was released close to the end of the selection process. However, it
41 We also tested whether the disclosure affects the share of freshmen elected can-
didates. Also in this case, we did not find any significant effect (results available upon
request).
could also be that audits released earlier have the strongest effect
because the incumbent would have longer to change the selection of
candidates.
For this analysis, we estimate the following regression separately
for the sub-samples of municipalities with high and low corruption:
Yist =
t=3∑
t=1
bt Tist × 1(t = t) + dXi + cs + kt + 4ist , (3)
where Tist interacts with a set of dummies for each trimester of the
treatment period. We report the results of these estimates in Fig. 2.
In the top panel we display point estimates and (95%) confidence
intervals from a regression limited to the sample of municipalities in
which audit reports revealed high levels of corruption, while in the
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Table 9
Audit releases and candidates’ characteristics.
All candidates New candidates
Income Median edu. Mayor edu. Female Age Income Median edu. Mayor edu. Female Age
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Pre-selection auditing −0.041 −0.431* −0.415 −0.012 −0.239 −0.063 −0.474* −0.615 −0.021 −0.250
(0.049) (0.225) (0.466) (0.013) (0.377) (0.057) (0.253) (0.687) (0.015) (0.426)
Pre-selection auditing× above median
corruption
0.118∗∗ 0.690∗∗ 0.309 0.010 0.449 0.160∗∗ 0.600* 0.434 0.010∗∗∗ 0.558
(0.060) (0.316) (0.594) (0.017) (0.508) (0.069) (0.346) (0.852) (0.020) (0.566)
Above median corruption 0.011 −0.018 0.177 −0.008 0.035 0.019 0.058 −0.023 −0.009 0.117
(0.026) (0.137) (0.256) (0.007) (0.218) (0.031) (0.151) (0.339) (0.009) (0.252)
F-test inter 0.050 0.125 0.646 0.578 0.765 0.011 0.173 0.821 0.309 0.563
R2 0.224 0.301 0.138 0.065 0.143 0.203 0.267 0.151 0.053 0.139
N observations 1665 1695 1195 1695 1694 1657 1695 663 1695 1694
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is ln(coalitions’ average salary) in Columns (1) and (6),median years of education in Columns (2) and (7),mayor cand. avg. number of years of education
in Columns (3) and (8), Share of female in columns (4) and (9) and average age in columns (5) and (10). Corruption is the share of the amount of the audited budget involved in
general violations. Municipality controls include: dummy party incumbent PT, ln(population), income, Gini coefficient, share of population with a secondary degree, share of population
employed, share of population working in agriculture, share of population working in industry, share of population working in commerce, share of population working in transport, share
of population working in service and share of population working in the public administration. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis.
∗ p < 0.1.
∗∗ p < 0.05.
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
bottom panel the analysis is constrained to municipalities with low
levels of corruption reported in their audit.
While all coefficients are borderline insignificant, we can draw
two interesting implications. First, the difference between the point
estimates from the two groups of municipalities remains relatively
stable over time. Second, the level of education of the selected candi-
dates is higher the closer to the election the report is disclosed. This
is true regardless of the report’s severity. Thus, for instance, auditing
disclosures that took place from 3months to 1month before the can-
didate list deadline had no effect on education when they revealed
low levels of corruption, but had a large positive effect in municipal-
ities with high levels of corruption. Hence, for a policy maker that
aims at improving the overall candidates’ quality would be optimal
to concentrate the auditing disclosure closer to the election. By doing
so, it should avoid the unintended negative effect on candidates’
quality coming from the disclosure of positive reports occurred far
from the election day.
6.2.4. Electoral results and local media
The mass media are the main channel through which citizens
are informed about politicians’ behavior (Enikolopov et al., 2011).
Indeed, the effect of a popularity shock on the electoral results
varies depending on the availability and accessibility of sources of
information (Ferraz and Finan, 2008; Costas-Pérez et al., 2012). If
the results shown so far come from parties that act in anticipa-
tion of the potential impact of the audit report on the electoral
results, we should also find that parties’ reactions depend on the
presence of local media. Therefore, we expect audit reports to have
a greater effect on the quality of candidates where citizens have
easier access to information. To test this hypothesis, we follow
Ferraz and Finan (2008) and account for the presence of local radio
stations to characterize the different degrees of media penetration
across municipalities. Therefore, we provide estimates by sepa-
rately considering (1) municipalities that have at least one local
AM/FM radio station and (2) municipalities with no local radio
stations.42
42 Similarly towhat was already discussed in Section 6.2.1, media presence in a given
municipality is not randomly assigned, which implies the following results are not
intended to establish causal links.
Initially, we look at the impact of the audit reports on electoral
outcomes. It is important to emphasize that this analysis adds to pre-
vious findings about the effect of the Brazilian auditing policy on
Fig. 2. Timing of the release — high and low corruption sub-samples.
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Table 10
Audit releases, electoral results and the quality of candidates by media presence.
Share of seats won Education of candidates
All Local radio No local radio All Local radio No local radio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pre-selection auditing 0.011 0.053∗∗ −0.019 −0.378∗∗ −0.582∗∗∗ −0.275
(0.018) (0.026) (0.025) (0.172) (0.182) (0.266)
Pre-selection auditing× above median corruption −0.031 −0.110∗∗∗ 0.024 0.724∗∗∗ 0.845∗∗∗ 0.578*
(0.024) (0.034) (0.033) (0.235) (0.304) (0.340)
Above median corruption 0.008 0.013 0.008 −0.017 −0.055 0.029
(0.010) (0.016) (0.014) (0.097) (0.134) (0.141)
F-test inter 0.520 0.006 0.707 0.012 0.006 0.240
R2 0.146 0.188 0.134 0.379 0.427 0.289
N observations 1695 730 965 1695 730 965
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is Share of seats won by the incumbent coalition in columns (1–3) and Average years of education of candidates – as a city councilor – from the incumbent
coalition in columns (4–6). Corruption is the share of the amount of the audited budget involved in general violations. Municipality controls include: dummy party incumbent
PT, ln(population), income, Gini coefficient, share of population with a secondary degree, share of population employed, share of population working in agriculture, share of population
working in industry, share of population working in commerce, share of population working in transport, share of population working in service and share of population working in the
public administration. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis.
∗ p < 0.1.
∗∗ p < 0.05.
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
electoral results since, to our knowledge, we are the first to exam-
ine how the disclosure of corruption might also affect city council
elections.43 Hence, we replicate the baselinemodel using the Share of
Seats won by the incumbent’s coalition as a dependent variable. We
first study the whole sample and then split it depending on whether
municipalities have local radio stations. The results are reported in
Columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table 10. The coefficients of interest are
only significant when looking at municipalities where citizens have
greater access to information. On the one hand, Column (2) shows
that inmunicipalities where the disclosure of a positive report occurs
during the selection period, the parties supporting the incumbent
mayor win 5% more seats, while if the report is negative they win
5% fewer seats.44 On the other hand, Columns (1) and (3) suggest
that, on average (and in the absence of a media presence) audits have
very little effect on the electoral results. We can draw three impor-
tant implications from these results. First, we can confirm that local
media play an essential role in the accountability process. Second,
the publication of the audit reports has a real effect on the election.
This is a crucial element as in order for parties to react to the results
of the audit report, they have to expect that voters care enough about
the contents of the report to change how they vote. Third, voters still
punish corrupt parties in elections even if they could select better
candidates. Indeed, the electoral reward of a positive report is not
affected by a potential decrease in the quality of candidates.
We then apply the same procedure to our baseline estimation.
In Column (4) we report the same results as Column (4) from
Table 4, while Columns (5) and (6) report the results for the sam-
ples of municipalities with and without local radio, respectively. In
municipalities with radio stations, when the disclosure of the report
provides a positive signal (i.e., low corruption) there is a decrease
in the average years of schooling of all candidates of a bit less
than 7months (coeff. −0.582), while there is an increase in educa-
tion of 3months when the report provides a negative signal (coeff.
43 Ferraz and Finan (2008) show that corrupt mayors have a lower probability of
being re-elected, while Muço (2016) finds that voters also reduce their support of a
corrupt incumbent mayor’s party in presidential elections.
44 If we replicate this analysis and add to our treated municipalities those in which
the report is disclosed between the end of the selection period and election day, we
have slightly different results. While the punishment for having a negative report is
significant and of a similar magnitude, there is no electoral reward associated with
receiving a positive report.
0.845 − 0.582 = 0.263). The coefficients are of a similar size when
we consider either all candidates or only new candidates (Column
2). When we focus on municipalities with no local radio stations,
Columns (3) and (4), the effect is either not significant or borderline
significant and the reported coefficients are also smaller.
Overall, the results seem to be coherent with our intuition, as the
effect of the audit report appears to be larger, and statistically signif-
icantly different from 0 at the 1% level, only in municipalities where
citizens are likely to be more exposed to the media (i.e., those with
local radio stations).45 Interestingly, the substantial change in the
quality of the pool of candidates does not seem to be enough to sig-
nificantly change the electoral results. This might be explained by
the fact that voters’ reaction is endogenous to the incumbent polit-
ical selection. In other words, when corruption is higher (lower),
incumbents have stronger (weaker) incentives to improve political
selection. However, in this scenario, it is also intuitive to expect a
higher (lower) likelihood of electoral punishment. Therefore, it is
worth to stress that this is not a proper test on whether voters are
affected by parties’ reactions to popularity shocks.46
6.3. Sample selection
In our analysis, we always constrain the sample to municipali-
ties in which the incumbent’s coalition decides to run for election. In
other words, our sample is not random and hence we face external
validity limitations that are difficult to overcome. To partially reduce
concerns on this issue, we test whether there is any difference in
the probability of being part of our sample betweenmunicipalities in
which the auditing report was disclosed during the selection period
or at other times. Therefore, we take the sample provided by Brollo
et al. (2013), which includes all municipalities selected in the first 29
lotteries. From this larger sample, we keep the municipalities used
so far in the paper as well as those that were only excluded from the
45 We apply the same strategy by replicating the estimates in Table 9. The main
findings do not seem to be dependent on the presence of the media, except if the
dependent variable is the median level of education; in that case, similarly to the
results of this section, the effect appears to be more pronounced where local radio
stations are available.
46 In Appendix B, we also provide results indicating the absence of an effect on the
average quality of the elected candidates.
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analysis. Therefore, we create a first dummy variable, rerun (coali-
tion), which equals 1 if the incumbent coalition is participating in the
elections and 0 otherwise. We also define a second variable, rerun
(mayor/first term) which identifies whether an incumbent mayor,
who does not face a term limit, is running for re-election or not. We
report in Table 11 the formal test of the potential presence of self-
selection bias running the same specification we use for the baseline
analysis considering instead as an outcome variable whether i) the
incumbent coalition is participating in the following elections ii) the
incumbentmayor is running for re-election (conditional on being not
term limited). We find that the disclosure of the report (conditional
on the level of corruption) seems to have no effect on these out-
comes. In conclusion, this analysis suggests that a coalition’s decision
to run for re-election is uncorrelated with the treatment, and that
this is true for different levels of corruption.
7. Robustness checks
In this section, we describe a set of additional checks on the
robustness of the main findings we reported in Tables 4 and 5
together with a test on the reliability of our measure of corruption.
Appendix Table OA.3 shows that the results of the main analy-
sis are similar if we only use as control those municipalities that
have the auditing disclosure after the selection period. Similarly, our
results are unaffected when using as a control group only munici-
palities for which the audit was released, alternatively, within one
year after the election and within two years after the elections. We
exclude also municipalities where the report was published more
than twelve months before an election (Table OA.4). Appendix Table
OA.5 provides the results of changing the definition of the incum-
bent’s coalition to include all parties that supported the mayor in the
previous election, regardless of whether they do so in the follow-
ing election. The results are similar, though the positive effect on the
education of candidates running for office in highly corrupt munic-
ipalities is smaller than the one found with our standard definition
of incumbent’s coalition. This does not change if we consider the
extended sample which includes all the 1396 municipalities where
there is at least one candidate representing the old incumbent’s
coalition. Additionally, Appendix Table OA.6 includes an alternative
measure of schooling as a dependent variable — the share of candi-
dates that completed Mandatory School. Our findings are confirmed.
Further, in Appendix Table OA.7, we show that our results are mainly
Table 11
Sample selection — rerunning and auditing.
Rerun coalition Rerun mayor
(1) (2)
Pre-selection auditing −0.003 0.034
(0.020) (0.053)
Pre-selection auditing× above median
corruption
0.042 −0.070
(0.030) (0.072)
Above median corruption −0.014 0.025
(0.015) (0.032)
F-test inter 0.367 0.767
R2 0.082 0.033
N observations 1858 1256
State FE Yes Yes
Municipality control variables Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is rerun (coalition), in column (1), and rerun (mayor/first
term) in column (2). Municipality controls include: dummy party incumbent PT,
ln(population), income, Gini coefficient, share of population with a secondary degree,
share of population employed, share of population working in agriculture, share of popu-
lation working in industry, share of population working in commerce, share of population
working in transport, share of populationworking in service and share of populationwork-
ing in the public administration. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in
parenthesis.
driven by the candidates’ selection for the 2004 elections. A plausi-
ble explanation is that within our sample, the share of municipalities
with local radio is lower in the second term. Accounting for such
difference (i.e., comparing municipalities with/without a local radio
in the second term), our results are valid also within municipalities
audited in the term 2005–2008. Next, Appendix Table OA.8 provides
results on re-running candidates.While themagnitude of the effect is
similar to the one estimated so far, this is barely significant. We also
test whether the challenger reacts: i) when the incumbent coalition
is not running for re-election; ii) when the incumbent mayor is term
limited; iii) depending of the type of party organization; iv) depend-
ing on themargin of victory in the past elections; v) depending on the
number of candidates in the previous election; vi) depending on the
level of media presence. In none of the above cases we find conclu-
sive evidence, regarding a change in the challenger political selection
(see Table OA.9).
Finally, a potential concern about our identification is that our
corruption measure may be serving as a proxy for other municipal
features. In fact, whilemunicipalities are randomly assigned to either
a treated or control group, the level of corruption is not random and
might depend on specific municipal conditions. For instance, cor-
ruption is potentially higher where there is extensive use of public
investments, which usually occurs in bigger and richer cities. If this
is true, we may be estimating how the release of an audit (regard-
less of its severity) has a differential effect on candidates’ education,
for example in small vs. big or poor vs. rich cities. To help assess this
potential issue, we replicate our baseline estimations and include
additional interaction terms, wherewemultiply the treatment status
dummy by a set of covariates that could be expected to be correlated
with the level of corruption: Population, Income, Education and Share
of Pop. in Public Administration. The results, presented in Appendix
Table OA.10, reduce our concerns: in all the estimates, the interaction
between the treatment status variable and the level of corruption is
always significantly different from 0 and the coefficient is relatively
stable across the different specifications. Moreover, the interaction
terms that include the covariates never reach the conventional level
of significance, whether analyzed in separate estimations (Columns
1 to 4) or jointly (Column 5).47 Overall, this suggests that our mea-
sure of corruption is unlikely to be proxying for other municipal
characteristics.48
8. Conclusion
This paper provides some of the first evidence on the effect of
information about government behavior on the selection of political
candidates. Using city council election data from Brazil, we find that
an unexpected positive shock regarding the government’s honesty
has a detrimental effect on the quality of candidates put forward
by its coalition in the next election. By contrast, it selects better
candidates when there is a negative shock. Indeed, we show that
these effects are present whether we use the average or median
years of candidates’ schooling. Importantly, the results of our anal-
ysis are of similar size when focusing only on freshmen candidates.
Our findings also show that the power structure of parties and
the accessibility of information play a role. However, other candi-
date characteristics, such as the share of female candidates and the
average age of the pool of candidates, are not affected. We also
find that, despite the changes in the quality of candidates, neither
47 We find similar results when the interaction term uses dummies for the different
quartiles (Table OA.11).
48 Note that in this table, while the interpretation of the interaction term “Pre-
selection auditing X above median corruption” does not change, the uninteracted
coefficient “Pre-selection auditing” cannot be interpreted as in the previous tables, as
in this case, we interact it with more than one variable in the same regression.
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the electoral results nor the types of elected representatives seem
to be significantly affected. Overall, our analysis provides one of
the few causal estimates supporting the predictions of recent stud-
ies showing that political parties react to specific characteristics of
electoral competition (Galasso and Nannicini, 2011; Mattozzi and
Merlo, 2015).
In sum, our paper shows that information releases might have
indirect effects on electoral outcomes. In light of our results, it could
be plausible that studies showing a change in support for the incum-
bent after a popularity shock might underestimate the shock’s pure
effect on voters’ preferences, as their voting decisions might also
have been affected by changes to the quality of the pool of can-
didates. Finally, we find that the Brazilian policy analyzed in this
study does not help improve the quality of elected politicians. On the
contrary, in the absence of corruption, we observe that the incum-
bent party selects lower-ability candidates. In other words, parties
select lower-ability candidates when it is easier to win the election.
However, our results also suggest that a way to account for this unin-
tended effect of the anti-corruption measures on the dynamics of
political accountability would be to disseminate all reports closer to
end of the selection period. Indeed, only in this case the disclosure of
positive audit reports has no consequences on candidates’ quality.
Appendices A and B. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.07.011.
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